

Put in Acheson  
- memo 8/11/61  
C. E. R. J. H.  
August 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Acheson Memorandum

1. I would like to explain what I had in mind when I suggested that more options be placed before the President. I agree that the President cannot possibly be asked to consider the pros and cons of every single negotiating position. He might, however, wish to consider the various over-all options and then choose among them. For example, I would consider the Acheson paper a modified version of the status quo. This is not undesirable, it may indeed be the best solution. It might help the President, however, if the assumptions were made more explicit and if alternative strategies were presented. For example, it is conceivable to analyze the pros and cons of the option represented roughly by the views of Carl Kayser or Abe Chayes. Similarly, it might be useful to explore the pros and cons of a more offensive approach. Once the President has selected a general course, it should not be too hard to frame proposals consistent with it.
2. One way of arriving at this choice might be to consider explicitly just what we are after in Central Europe. What would we envisage Europe to be like in say 1965 on the assumption of various courses of action?
3. In analyzing the various possibilities, it may be useful to consider the consequences not only of the success of a given course of action but also the impact of making a given proposal, whether or not it is accepted.
4. If the Acheson paper becomes the basic policy, a more detailed study of its various features becomes important. Items which require more careful consideration in addition to those discussed yesterday include:  
  
European security schemes.  
The details of the arrangements on Berlin. (Some of the phraseology at the bottom of page 7 referring to discouraging excessive movements of people seems to me dangerous, and some other clauses are vague.)

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U.S. ARCHIVES (NWK-78-657)
By <u>ARM</u> NARS, Date <u>1/21/81</u>

The nature and purpose of the Mixed German  
Committee. (I am doing a paper on that.)  
The nature of the NATO command structure.  
The military consequences of a failure of nego-  
tiations. (I remain extremely uneasy about  
that.)

Henry Kissinger